Collective Epistemic Goals
(2007) Collective Epistemic Goals. Social Epistemology 21(3).
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Abstract
We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group--and sometimes even the group itself--to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.
| EPrint Type: | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Collectives, Epistemic Goals, Distribution of Knowledge, Group Belief |
| Subjects: | Philosophy Epistemology Social Epistemology |
| ID Code: | 2095 |
| Deposited On: | 21 November 2007 |
| Alternative Locations: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691720701674106 |
| Eprint Statistics: | View statistics for this eprint |
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