Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics
(2004) Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics. Minds and Machines 14(1).
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Abstract
Three of the major issues in information ethics—intellectual property, speech regulation, and privacy—concern the morality of restricting people’s access to certain information. Consequently, policies in these areas have a significant impact on the amount and types of knowledge that people acquire. As a result, epistemic considerations are critical to the ethics of information policy decisions (cf. Mill 1978 [1859]). The fact that information ethics is a part of the philosophy of information highlights this important connection with epistemology. In this paper, I illustrate how a value-theoretic approach to epistemology can help to clarify these major issues in information ethics. However, I also identify several open questions about epistemic values that need to be answered before we will be able to evaluate the epistemic consequences of many information policies.
| EPrint Type: | Journal Article (On-line/Unpaginated) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | epistemic value theory, epistemology, information ethics, intellectual property, philosophy of information, privacy, social epistemology, speech regulation |
| Subjects: | Philosophy Social Epistemology Information Ethics |
| ID Code: | 1578 |
| Deposited On: | 20 October 2006 |
| Alternative Locations: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:MIND.0000005138.57370.df |
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